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FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUBPOENA OF NONRESIDENT
CITIZEN AS WITNESS BEFORE GRAND JURY-Defendant, a nonresident citizen
of the United States, was subpoenaed1 by a federal district court to appear
before a grand jury investigating alleged fraud in the procurement of
government contracts. Defendant having failed to appear, the district court
issued an order directing him to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt. On appeal from a judgment holding defendant in contempt,2
held, reversed, one judge dissenting in part. The power of a federal district
court to subpoena a nonresident citizen is limited to the actual trial of a
criminal action. United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1963).
The effect of the redrafting of the Walsh Act3 in the 1948 revision of
the Federal Judicial Code was the sole issue of significance in the principal
case. As enacted, the Walsh Act empowered the federal courts to subpoena

1 In conformity with
Wall personally served on

the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1783(b) (1958), the subpoena
defendant by the American Vice-Consul in the Philippines, and
a first-class round trip ticket and travel expenses tendered.
2 In re Thompson, 213 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
3 Walsh Act of 1926, ch. 762, § 2, 44 Stat. 835; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421

(1932).
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nonresident citizens as witnesses at the "trial of any criminal action."~
Section 1783 of the revised Judicial Code permits the issuing of a subpoena
for attendance at a "criminal proceeding." 5 While it is clear that the
original provision was not intended to apply to a grand jury proceeding,
the term "criminal proceeding" incorporated in the revision is arguably of
wider scope. 6 Since the issue turns on a narrow question of statutory interpretation, initial consideration must be given to the revisers' notes which
accompany the text of the Judicial Code. Commenting on the general
policies under which the revisers worked, the chief reviser wrote:
"[N]o changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes of
language in revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly
expressed. Mere changes of phraseology indicate no intent to work a
change of meaning but merely an effort to state in clear and simpler
terms the original meaning of the statute revised. Congress recognized
this rule by including in its reports the complete Revisers' Notes to
each section in which are noted all instances where change is intended
and the reasons therefor." 7
To understand the subtle significance of the chief reviser's statement, comparison must be made to the well settled rule of construction of revised
statutes and codifications unaccompanied by explanatory notes. Changes
in phraseology do not import a substantive change of law or policy "unless
the intent of the legislature to alter the law is evident or the language of
the new act is palpably such as to require a different construction."8 The
chief reviser would demand not only that the change of law be manifest
in the language of the revision, but that it be specifically acknowledged in
the notes. In the notes following section 1783 there is in fact no mention
of the change in phraseology at issue. However, the original language of
the Walsh Act succinctly and unambiguously limited the subpoena power
of the federal courts over nonresident citizens to the actual trial of a
4 "Whenever the attendance at the trial of any criminal action of a witness, being a
citizen of the United States, or domiciled therein, who is beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States, is desired by the Attorney General or any assistant or district attorney
acting under him, the judge of the court before which such action is pending ••• may,
upon a proper showing, order that a subpoena issue • • • commanding such witness to
appear before the said court •••• " Walsh Act of 1926, ch. 762, § 2, 44 Stat. 835.
5 "A court of the United States may subpoena, for appearance before it, a citizen
or resident of the United States who ... is beyond the jurisdiction of the United States
and whose testimony in a criminal proceeding is desired by the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1783(a) (1958).
6 In two previous cases, a district court has exercised its alleged power under § 1783
to subpoena nonresident citizens before a federal grand jury, holding them in contempt
upon failure to appear. United States v. Stem, No. Mll-188, S.D.N.Y. 1957, appeal dismissed,
249 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958); United States v. Leff, Docket
143/309, S.D.N.Y. 1954.
7 Barron, The Judicial Code, 1918 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 445-46 (1949). (Emphasis
added.)
a Principal case at 669. (Emphasis added.) See United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729,
740 (1884); Barron, supra note 7, at 446-48, and cases collected therein.
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criminal action. The failure of the language employed in section 1783 to
clarify the original in any way is apparent. The change in phraseology
therefore cannot reasonably be characterized as merely an attempt at clari:6.cation.9 Viewed with the original language of the Walsh Act in mind, the
language of section 1783 clearly evidences an intention to increase the scope
of the courts' subpoena power. At the same time, however, the revisers' notes
purport to deny any such intention by omitting reference to the change in
phraseology.
The majority opinion in the principal case avoided the ultimate issue
by isolating the phrase "criminal proceeding."10 By reference to decisions
interpreting the phrase in other contexts,11 and without reference to the
original language of the Walsh Act, the court found the expression "criminal
proceeding"-and thus the language of section 1783-"at best, ambiguous."12 The absence of notation of the change in phraseology was thus
deemed controlling.13 Had the issue been properly framed in terms of a
conflict between the results dictated by the language of section 1783 (viewed
in the light of the Walsh Act's original language) 14 and the revisers' notes,
the former would almost certainly have prevailed despite the chief reviser's
contentions to the contrary.15
In evaluating the magnitude of the law enforcement problem created
by the majority, opinion, it is important to understand that, had its decision been otherwise, significant problems would nevertheless have remained.
The Walsh Act is in its very conception inadequate, for law enforcement
problems occasioned by a witness' flight beyond the territorial borders of
the United States admit of solution only through the enlistment of foreign
judicial aid, presumably by bilateral international agreement. 16 The Walsh
Act, however, is unilateral in design. The United States has the power,
o Principal case at 671 (dissenting opinion of Kaufman, J.).
10 Id. at 668.
11 E.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); Post v. United States, 161 U.S. 583, 587
(1896); Mullony v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 578-80 (1st Cir. 1935). But see Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906).
12 Principal case at 668.
13 Id. at 669-70.
14 Cf. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1956).
115 The revisers' notes are "authoritative in perceiving the meaning of the Code ...."
United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 81 (1949). However, the absence of
notation of changes in phraseology should not be conclusive of legislative intent where
a substantive change is clearly reflected in the alteration of the statute itself. Though
numerous cases have quoted approvingly from Barron, supra note 7, reference to the
revisers' notes has been made only upon a determination that the language of the
statute itself was ambiguous. E.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., supra note 14;
Glenn v. United States, 231 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926 (1956). "[T]here
is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear." Ex
parte Collette, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1948) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948)); see Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 530 (1942); Bate Refrigerating Co. v.
Sulzberger, 157 U.S. I, 45 (1895); United States v. Bowen, 100 U.S. 508, 513 (1880).
16 See generally Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a
Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Mueller, International Judicial Assistance
in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L. REv. 193 (1962).

1074

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

62

inherent in its sovereignty, to require nonresident citizens to return to this
country whenever the public interest demands.17 In fact, reliance is placed
solely on the coercive effect of the courts' subpoena power. Where the witness has no property in the United States to satisfy a contempt decree incident to his refusal to answer a subpoena, 18 that decree has little coercive
effect. A more effective device might be statutory revocation of the passport
upon failure to comply with a subpoena.
Nonetheless, within the present framework of the Walsh Act, the unavailability of nonresident citizens to testify before grand juries should
occasion less frequent problems than might seem the case. The considerations applicable to the problem of securing witnesses before an investigating
grand jury are wholly different from those applicable to the problem of
securing witnesses before a trial court. The significance of the courts' subpoena power in the latter case arises from the right of confrontation which
the sixth amendment affords the accused in a criminal prosecution and the
rules regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Hearsay alone, however, even where it would be clearly incompetent before a petit jury, can
legally support a grand jury indictment where a witness possessed of
immediate knowledge is unavailable to testify. 19
Should Congress consider legislation remedial of the instance where a
nonresident citizen is alone possessed of evidence indispensable to the
securing of an indictment, provision might profitably be made for the taking
of depositions or the issuing of letters rogatory20 as a discretionary alternative to the courts' increased subpoena powers.21 If and to the extent that
foreign law permits such procedures,22 provision might be made for cases
in which the witness is unable to comply with a subpoena because of illness
or substantial hardship.2a
Andre A. Schwartz
17 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); cf. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 281 (1918).
18 28 u.s.c. § 1784 (1958).
19 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
20 While 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1958) provides the procedure for the issuance of letters
rogatory or a commission to take depositions, there exists no provision enabling federal
courts to issue letters rogatory or take depositions for grand jury proceedings.
21 The validity of an indictment depends on the rational persuasiveness of the evidence
before the grand jury, rather than on its trial competence. Costello v. United States, 221
F.2d 668, 677-79 (2d Cir.), afj'd, 350 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1956) (concurring opinion of Burton,
J.). In view of Costello and the ex parte nature of grand jury proceedings, it seems
doubtful than an indictment would be held to have been improperly returned if supported
solely by evidence secured by deposition or letters rogatory, even where the sixth amend•
ment right of confrontation would render such evidence incompetent before a petit
jury. See generally Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 111 (1948); Note, 65 YALE L.J. 390 (1956).
22 See Jones, supra note 16, at 518-34; Mueller, supra note 16, at 202•15.
23 As was alleged by the defendant in the principal case. Principal case at 666.

